Summary. Well supported and institutionalised, the social history of medicine thrives. Its research agenda is infinitely expandable, and its humanist sentiments continue to touch emotional cords. Politically and intellectually, however, it is sterile. In a material and intellectual world that is radically different from the one in which it came into being, the social history of medicine has lost its capacity seriously to engage. This paper suggests that medico-centric historians not only have the expertise to re-engage with the contemporary bio-centric world, but that they have need to do so, and, moreover, every reason to take to the task enthusiastically. Crucial to moving on is understanding and seriously engaging with the moral-political and epistemological landscapes for medicine and its historiography, past and present.
our current situation, I want to urge against that insinuation, following here in the footsteps of one of my more optimistic and intelligent colleagues.
3 Indeed, it is precisely in order to avoid such a fate that comprehending where we are now in relation to where we have been in the past seems crucial. It is in not knowing that the danger looms of becoming beached. That said, it is not easy to express what is necessary: simultaneously to depict the politico-economic world of medicine and material culture in which we find ourselves, and the contemporary world of knowledge and thought that accompanies itlet alone hint at how those domains might be part and parcel of each other. The intellectual movement known as postmodernity, and the political economics of what some have come to call 'second modernity' 4 are far too close and encompassing to permit anything like a complete decipherment. And the task is not helped by my thinking that those more versed in either of these realms will see it as merely teaching granny to suck eggs, while others, unversed in either, will regard it as all too remote and inappropriate, comparable on this special occasion to a reading of Finnegan's Wake at a wedding fest. But it seems worth the effort, given that we are probably at the most important crossroads in the history of thought since the seventeenth century, and at the most profound shift in the political-economic organisation of the world since early industrialisation and state formation, and-crucial here-that biomedicine and biosocial processes are deeply implicated in both. It's worth a go, then, almost regardless of the implications for the practice of the history of medicine. In any case, in my experience grannies often understand less than they think (besides being stuck in their ways), while those who are baffled do not always wish to remain so. Given the enormity of the sources for confusion, there seems no need to apologise for the undertaking, nor for its execution in what must be necessarily broad brush strokes.
The Social History of Medicine in the Shadow of Now
In the past, social historians of any sort had little need seriously to intellectualise the context in which they practised their craft. (Indeed, there were those who smugly suggested that social history was for those who were incapable of such mental effort.) 5 For fledgling social historians of medicine in the 1970s-that is, the 'new'
was intellectual and what was political; the practice of the social history of medicine and its morals were indivisible, the one collapsed into the other. The world was so different from now, virtually cold-war-like in its Right-Left intellectual disposition, its re-entry into the ideological, 7 and its belief in 'reality' and 'rationality', especially scientific rationality as the alpha and omega of modernity. AIDS had yet seriously to blur the conventional distinction between 'the cultural' and 'the biological', along with the disciplinary boundaries historically separating sociology, ecology and biology. 8 With regard to medicine's past and present there were the empowered and the oppressed: established institutions and medical agents on the one hand, and patients and the pathologised and medicalised on the other (especially women, the working-class and the mad). The mediation of contemporary political concern with inequalities in health care was evident not only in the preoccupation with medical power in all its excrescences, but in the egalitarian 'social' approach to it. It was enough therefore merely to commit oneself to the mission of the social history of medicine; all that was needed was faith in the broadly left-liberal politics of social change that lay behind it. No methodological membership was required. Indeed, for the most part, this history was written without reference to methods, or to that suspicious-nay 'impoverished'-thing called 'theory '. 9 Not that specific tools could not be tried out-a bit of prosopography here, a bit of statistics there, all generously overlaid with reference to class, race and gender. To a degree, this history-writing was anti-methodological in much the same way, and for much the same reason as present-day ethnography in its effort not to prejudge what is to be encountered-or, for historians, 'contaminate' the evidence to be 'discovered' in the archive. 10 As in the economic history out of which social history grew, findings were held capable of revelation of their own accord, and in themselves resolutely unproblematic. Flat-footed in this respect, the practice was also anti-intellectual inasmuch as the older intellectual history that treated ideas as precious and transcendent was one of the elitist enemies of the social contextual approach. Of course, these attitudes and approaches themselves constituted a 'method' of sorts, and this was defended through declarations of ecumenicalism. To Roy Porter, late doyen of the social history of medicine in Britain, it seemed admirable that the discipline was 'not polarized into doctrinaire sects, but . . . characterized by a healthy pluralism and diversity '. 11 As if echoing William Blake's outrage at Newtonian science, the social history of medicine was to be no friend to 'single vision'. At most, the sub-discipline was 'schooled' by its shared commitment to the broadest possible analysis of social contexts. 12 By definition almost, the practice was conducted at the social surface, guided by attention to the interests and ideologies imposed upon history's silent majorities. And all was well. But it is not so well anymore. In a world in which 'reality' and 'rationality' no longer command unquestioned respect (in the clinical setting as everywhere else), 13 and 'vision', too, submits to intellectual disembowelling, 14 the prospects are poor for a naively realist historical practice that comforts itself in sentimental siding with the silenced. 15 If, as in the commodities market, exchange creates value and value is embodied in things that are exchanged (with politics, broadly construed, as the link between exchange and value), 16 the share price of the politics of the social history of medicine has plummeted. Of course, its practitioners can continue to behave as they have, borrowing widely from the ever-shifting investigative approaches of sociologists, anthropologists, psychologists, and gender, cultural and subaltern studies, and then celebrate this eclecticism in glorified narratives of the sub-discipline's progress. The successful institutionalisation of the field encourages it. But from postmodern perspectives entertained elsewhere in the world of learning, the enterprise appears like an idle story continuing to be told in a fool's paradise. It would be as well to admit that the game is up, its cultural moment over, and, in retiring, concur with the American doyen of the field, Charles Rosenberg, that the shelf-life of the historian is short. 17 Social historians of medicine can rest assured that their original mission has been accomplished. They can also reiterate, without shame, the conventional historian's view that history-writing always moves on, buffeted by the political, cultural and economic winds of change. Reiterate it, yes, but perform it, no. Comforting though such a view of disciplinary transformation might be, it is naive. A new shelf-life for the social history of medicine cannot be made merely by historiographically tweaking the sub-discipline in accord 12 The same, of course, can be said of most recent history. Reflecting on history-writing, the classical historian Paul Veyne (1971, p. 12) remarked that 'there is no method of history because history makes no demands; so long as one relates true things, it is satisfied'. Rare, indeed, are essays such as Robert Darnton's 'The Great Cat Massacre ' (1984) , which explicitly sought to test historically the anthropological technique of 'thick description' elaborated by Clifford Geertz. 13 At most, 'rationality' in the clinic is now seen as operating as a kind of regulatory myth. See Mol 2002;  and for the history of the effort to rationalise medicine, or turn it from an 'art' to a 'science', see Berg 1997 . 14 Cartwright 1995 Sturken and Cartwright 2001; Rose 2007; Mirzoeff 1999; Jay 1993. 15 Illustrative is Jenner and Taithe's lament: 'It is sad but revealing that so little of the new history of the body has turned to such themes [once common in the social history of medicine, of] . . . the care of the sick, weak, aged or infirm whether in institutions, the family or neighbourhood. . . . We have next to no historical discussion of the body of the loved one-parent, child, or partner-(as opposed to the sexual body). This is all too often a historiography largely devoid of tenderness, of effect and indeed of respect' (Jenner and Taithe in Cooter and Pickstone (eds) 2003, p. 199) . As Palladino (2001, p. 549) points out however, in citing this passage, 'a more ethical and politically reflective engagement with the silenced might instead begin with the historian's acknowledgment of the power of the hegemonic discourse that silenced them in the first place'. 16 Hence, for Appadurai (in Appadurai (ed.) 1986, p. 3) the conceit that commodities, like persons, have social lives. 17 In his key note lecture on the socialist pioneer of the social history of medicine, Erwin Ackerknecht, to the Society for the Social History of Medicine conference at Warwick University, 2006. with contemporary political, cultural and economic conditions, or merely through a change of spots that re-brands it 'the cultural history of medicine'. The very idea of 'conditions' acting as causal agents has come to seem deeply flawed, as has the notion of 'the political', 'the cultural', and 'the economic' as having discrete explanatory power. So, too, along with the idea of the divisibility of 'the cultural' and 'the material' has been quashed. Indeed, all the analytical categories basic to history-writing in general have buckled under the appreciation of them as highly subjective and arbitrary. Increasingly, that which serves to explain has been pulled apart from that which aspires to be explained.
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For the social history of medicine, not the least important of the categories to spring apart was 'the social'.
19 Since the work of Patrick Joyce in the mid-1990s, 'the social' as a representation of the structure of society has come to be perceived as other than the neutral explanatory term that social historians presumed. Far from being capable of innocent historical application, 'the social' is now regarded as itself a historical construct, a product of 'modernity'-the project (as Joyce says) that 'disguises the fact that "individual" and "society" are not real, "objective" entities, but historical and normative creations, designed to handle the exigencies of political power and political order '. 20 Working from this postmodern insight, Mary Poovey proceeded to show how the notion of the 'social body' was a discursive product of the nineteenth century which came to be formalised through the efforts of human engineers such as Edwin Chadwick.
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More than merely 'the social' fell with the fall of the social, although not because of it. The category of 'class' submitted to the same deconstruction, coming to be seen as merely linguistically productive rather than reality reflective (which is not to say that it came to be regarded simply as a 'fiction'-like love, historical constructs are 'real').
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But worse, from the perspective of conventional historical understanding, was the assault on the very bedrock of history-writing: objectivity and factuality. In order for facts to be 'facts', it came to be seen, they required an epistemological tradition of knowledge-understanding and appreciation in which 'facts' matter-a tradition (made more sturdy through nineteenth-century positivism) in which they empower and stand-in for moral truths. 23 That facts in order to be 'facts' had already to be in a 'theory' as it were, was not an insight peculiar to the 1980s and 1990s. Since the 1970s, in the then new social historical approach to scientific knowledge, the conventional binary between 'objective fact'/'social value', or 'fact'/'interpretation', 'science'/'ideology', and 'nature'/'culture', was seen as playing an ideological role, sustaining the self-serving positivist myth of the neutrality and objectivity of science. Vernon 2005, and 2007 (forthcoming) , 'an attempt to imagine what social history and histories of welfare might look like after the cultural and imperial turns'. 22 'Class' received its best deconstruction from Gareth Stedman Jones in a series of papers informed by the linguistic turn but still within a Marxist framework. For the references and their historiographical contextualisation, see Eley in McDonald (ed.) 1996. 23 For the major American critique of this history-writing, see Novick 1988. to be understood as ideologically constituted, and facticity as something that could be ideologically deployed. The origins of this particular view, which by the 1980s led those in social studies of science to regard scientific truth as a social construct, 24 lay with the Frankfurt School's critique of positivism as a philosophy that absolutised facts as a means to concretising the social order. 25 The Frankfurt School nevertheless remained committed to the veracity of its own (Marxist) dialectical method for representing the construction of social and cultural 'reality' and for acting politically upon it. From a different angle, the classical historian Paul Veyne in the early 1970s, argued that historical facts are only 'facts' once the plot or historical narrative has been decided upon by the historian. Were it not for the plot, Veyne suggested, the facts to fit it would not exist. 26 Here, in a manner not unlike that soon to be asserted by postmodern literary theorists such as Hayden White, 'facts' were being understood not in the way of professional historians, as truth-bearing neutral things, but rather as qualifiers of a narrative a priori. To this understanding, postmodern thinking would add the insight that what qualifies the narrative is an epistemological closure: the culturally exalted, unquestioned nature of facts and facticity. As Hayden White summed it up:
The principal difference between history and [postmodern thinking] . . . is that the latter brings the conceptual apparatus by which the facts are ordered in the discourse to the surface of the text, while history proper (as it is called) buries it in the interior of the narrative, where it serves as a hidden or implicit shaping device.
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Social historians pursuing the facts of medicine's past could thus be regarded as acting in ways that were, in effect, scarcely different from older positivist historians of medicine, those very persons from whom they sought so militantly to distance themselves. The social history of medicine was a part of the same Enlightenment project-the project that invented the 'disciplines'. 28 It was written within the same rationality (perceived as a stable category), and according to the same rules of objectivity (as unquestionably distinguishable from subjectivity). Indeed, the enterprise shared the project of modern medicine itself: while medicine objectified the body, history objectified the past. 29 Both sets of practitioners in employing supposedly value-neutral means to uncover facts were drawing on a strategy (empiricism) that was only invented during the Renaissance and solidified during the Enlightenment. 30 Hence 'empirical evidence' truth claims by social historians of medicine were doing no more than legitimising a historically constructed technique. Little wonder that the scientistic practices of historical demography, and social science approaches to health policy were so easily entertained in the social history of medicine. 24 Shapin 1994; Poovey 1998; Shapiro 2000 . In ways too complicated to go into here, the social constructivist view of scientific knowledge owed much to Kuhn (1970) , a text that was largely inspired by his re-discovery of Fleck's work of 1935 (Fleck 1979) . 25 Jay 1973, p. 62 . 26 Veyne 1971, p. 32 . On the reciprocity of 'facts' and 'interpretations' in historical writing, see also Carr 1964 . 27 White 1978 , quoted in Jenkins 1991 , p. viii. 28 Jay 1993 As Long (2004) points out, this is unsurprising since the modern disciplines of medicine and historywriting grew up together during the latter half of the nineteenth century. 30 Olgivie 2006. In the course of de-essentialising 'the social' and de-naturing history-writing itself along with all its foundational analytical categories, postmodern thinking threw into question and de-centred the very thing that the social history of medicine was supposed to analyse: the nature of the power of medicine. In the original conception of the field, 'medicine' referred simply to the discipline of its practice; medico-centric, it stood for the study of doctors and the making and exercise of their professional interests. Social constructivist historical accounts of the process of medicalisation were no different, they simply revealed medical knowledge as a tool in social coercion, or in the creation of 'falseconscious' consent. 31 The analysis could be sophisticated or crude. Simple-minded 'social control' models, for example, were soon discarded in favour of Antonio Gramsci's notion of cultural hegemony. But it was always about the exercise of power passively received on the part of the medicalised; implicitly or explicitly, it was about power's determining impact on social habits and consciousness. 'Power' in this prescriptive Marxian-derived sense was understood more or less instrumentally. Whether it was perceived to be exercised subtly (à la Gramsci) or bluntly (mechanically, à la vulgar marxism), power was an inherently anti-humanist tool that served a particular configuration of social organisation, tidy hierarchically conceived social relations. The social history of medicine at its most refined was the study of the knit between social power thus understood and medical knowledge and practice. And the analysis of medical knowledge invariably revealed what it assumed: reproductions of the layer-cake social order. Like the semiotic (structuralist) analysis of painting and poetry, it was all a matter of decoding between things that were taken to be fixed in and of themselves, and which were assumed to be conceivable on the same analytical plane.
The relatively late introduction into this discussion of 'the patient' as an explicit topic was also within this social structural understanding of power and its repressive exercise.
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To be sure, the recovery of the patient from the condescensions of medical posterity proved hard enough (given the shortage of records), but as 'history from below' or from the 'bottom up' it was only ever the other side of the same coin of the older history of medicine conducted from the top down. By the very nature of that opposition, the idea of a patient-orientated history of medicine could only reveal more stories about the exercise of power and the reproduction of power relations by the medical profession, including stories of resistance which simply reinforced the same notion of power. Significantly, Roy Porter's pleas in the mid-1980s for such histories were contained in books historicising patients and practitioners. 33 More important, while the category 'the patient' was simply taken for granted, 34 the body of the patient-implicit to all history of medicine-was left largely unattended. It was simply assumed that bodies were 31 Such was the point of my study of phrenology : Cooter 1984 ; see also Wright and Treacher (eds) 1982;
Stollberg and Lachmund (eds) 1992. 32 The pioneering call was Porter 1985a. 33 Porter 1985b, p. 1: 'We have histories of diseases but not of health, biographies of doctors but not of the sick.' Likewise, see Porter and Porter (1989) on, as the subtitle has it, Doctors and Doctoring. Porter justified the recovery of the patient in the history of medicine on the grounds that the patient had 'disappeared' from modern medicine. 34 Only now is the history of 'the patient' coming to be explored, in, for example, Stolberg 2003 and, more conceptually, in work begun by Flurin Condrau.
imposed upon by rational minds-manipulated to political ends. Hence, like 'the social', 'class', 'history' and 'power', the body was among the 'invariants' of the social history of medicine, those underlying unquestioned things that in their taken-for-granted-ness serve to define a field's problematic. Invariants structure the questions possible and impossible to ask; they are the implicit rules by which answers are formulated.
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The Weight of Foucault Ironically, and confusingly for students of the historiography of medicine, it was around the same time that the social history of medicine was becoming institutionalised (in the late 1970s and 1980s) that everything that it knowingly and unknowingly stood for became unstuck through events external to it. There were many reasons, but none was more important intellectually than the work of Michel Foucault.
One of the three towering figures of late twentieth-century thought, 36 Foucault in effect undermined the purpose of the social history of medicine by raising to the surface and problematising its 'invariants', including, above all, the nature of power (in relation to medical knowledge especially) and the body. Not that Foucault was interested in critiquing the history of medicine. A self-styled 'archaeologist' of knowledge, 37 his pursuit was the genealogy of structures of thought; that is, with changes in the expression of the relations between power and knowledge (materially and institutionally as much as in language and discourse), and the reconstitutions over time of this knowledge/power nexus. He was not particularly interested in how epistemological disjunctures came about, or with the contexts for this. He was fascinated by the rules and practices that produce meaningful statements in particular contexts, or that regulate what can be spoken, understood and perceived in different historical periods. These were the 'politics of truth' within what he came to call 'epistemes' (regimes of knowledge) to refer to the particular 'discursive regimes' within which these regimes of truth hold sway. To think this way was to operate outside the box of the meta-narratives within which history was written and which it reinforced through its very existence. Since the 1960s, around medical knowledge and medical institutions especially, Foucault had developed a concept of power (and methods to investigate it) that centred on the micro-management of individual human bodies through various disciplinary techniques. 38 Power did not derive simply through social and political institutions, he argued, nor did it function merely by coercion. Rather, it operated through, and was inscribed upon, the body, which at the same time was directly involved in a political field where power relations had an immediate hold upon it-that 'invest it, mark it, train it, 35 I borrow this concept from Veyne 1988, although his use of it is in relation to arguments for documents appropriate to a particular historical problematic. According to him, it is only when invariants get questioned that the hitherto sacredness of particular documents falls away: pp. 22ff. 36 The other two were Jacques Derrida, from whom the 'literary turn' in cultural studies mainly derives, and Gilles Deleuze, whom Foucault (1970a, p. 196) Davidson 2001. torture it, force it to carry out tasks, to perform ceremonies, to emit signs'. 39 Since the late eighteenth century, he believed, innumerable systems had come into place to encourage people to self-regulate without any active threat of punishment. An internalised managerial gaze came to watch over, and this gaze-this surveillance-whether active or not, produces conforming behaviours. These are 'docile bodies' that act exactly as they are expected to without being physically forced. This was an understanding of power as a productive agency, rather than a negatively experienced repressive force, as in Marxist scripts and social history narratives. 40 Moreover, Foucault argued, it was precisely through somatic discourse or through discursive practices operative in and upon the physicality of the body that modern power is constituted and exercised. Thus Foucault increasingly corporealised power in general, at the same time as he de-centred the old notion of medical power in particular. Medical power was now to be understood not simply in terms of state initiatives, or to be found in the history of doctors and their institutions, but rather, in the implicit rules of disciplinary discourses that work on the bodies of individuals. And in not being regarded as 'sovereign', or unitary or centralised, power was not to be conceived as instrumentally wielded by obvious agents. Rather, it was to be understood as embedded everywhere in the social body of health that since the eighteenth century was making up our 'biosocial' or somatic-body-centred-culture. Hence Foucault's increasing use of biopower (with an attendant biopolitics) to refer to knowledge-producing processes through which institutional practices come to define, measure, categorize and construct the body and somatically shape all experience, meaning and understanding of life.
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For the social history of medicine this was good news and bad. On the one hand, the attention Foucault gave to matters of medicine and the body-to the history of mental illness, human sexuality, public health and the female body in particular-lent to the subdiscipline a certain intellectual cache. Insofar as these were familiar territories, and insofar as Foucault (especially in his early work) had not so much rubbished concepts like medicalisation as enriched them, it was not too difficult to appropriate his ideas into existing socio-historical scripts. His notion of the body, in spite of the elaboration of it in terms of a discursive formation, remained nevertheless inherently an organic, physical entity. 42 In any case, for social historians of medicine it was relatively easy to transplant Foucault's notion of 'discourse' or 'discursive regimes' into their 'wider context' concerns. And all too readily 'discourse' could stand in for the more discrete and politically barbed notion of 'ideology'. Of course, there were those in history and the history of medicine who, mistaking Foucault for a new-fangled historian of ideas, believed that he had crashed their particular party, and hence sought to crucify him for alleged empirical shortcomings. 43 Others, 39 Foucault 1979, p. 25. 40 See Burchell et al. (eds) 1991; Dreyfus and Rabinow (eds) 1982; Fox 1999, pp. 106ff . According to Marx, power has transformative agency in social relations. Nevertheless, the will to that agency or to emancipating humanity in Marxism is by definition based on repressive experience, particularly that of capitalist power. 41 Foucault in Rabinow and Rose (eds) 2003; and see Rose and Rabinow 2006. 42 This was the criticism of G. Deleuze and F. Guattari; see Fox 1999, pp. 114 -15. 43 For example, Jones and Porter (eds) 1994, although this also contains one of the more historically useful commentaries on Foucault: Rose in Jones and Porter (eds) 1994. For a late reactionary critique, see Evans 1997. notably in the social history of science, disdained the 'F word' feeling (not incorrectly, but for the wrong reasons) that Foucault was something of a Johnny-come-lately, adding nothing new to their well-honed social constructivist analysis. 44 Still others, sensitive to the mediations of power in different kinds of practice, complained of his emphasis on language and discourse. But none could ignore Foucault even when they tried, and since his difficult-to-penetrate prose and continually changing and thickening thought was not easily measured against the premises and politics of the social history of medicine, nothing of the kind was undertaken, while direct and indirect borrowings became widespread. It was not obvious that he had pulled the carpet from under the sub-discipline by positing that social and political subjectivity were historical constructs, and that by arguing this he had rendered visible the hitherto invisible 'invariants' of social history. But on the other hand, Foucault was perceived as trouble from the start. Not least, the attention he directed to the body appeared to undermine its custodianship by historians of medicine. Across the academy, as across popular culture, 'the body' was soon everyone's business and obsession. 45 The robust intellectual challenges that Foucault draped around it meant that the largely non-corporeally-orientated empiricist social historical interest in doctors and their institutions was paled by comparison. Further, the subdiscipline looked all the more gaunt next to the vibrant and ever-extending Foucault industry generated mainly by sociologists, philosophers, linguists, political theorists and gender and cultural studies. 46 At their hand, the body was transformed from a static and discrete biological organism to something shaped by dynamic discourses, practices, technologies and ideologies. 47 Moreover, the 'somatic turn' with which Foucault impregnated the contemporary 'literary turn' was a fast breeder, soon fusing with exciting newer turns to 'the visual', 'the spatial' and 'the sensual'. 48 Each of these extended and deepened Foucault's quest to identify and explore the invisible yet most powerful technologies of 'life' itself, and to put the contemporary politics of this biological identification of being high on the intellectual agenda. 49 The preoccupations of the social history of medicine looked more and more quaint. As worrying to practitioners of the social history of medicine was Foucault's articulation of power. In promoting the importance of biopower as a diffused and increasingly pervasive discourse (rather than attending to discrete biopolitical agents), 50 he radically challenged the structuralist-functionalist model of power upon which the social(-injustice) history of medicine had been premised. Rose and Miller 1992, p. 174 . For a comprehensive overview of the changes in the historiography of public health in the English-speaking world emerging from Foucault's concept of power, see Lupton 1995. 51 'By humanism I mean the totality of discourse through which Western man is told . . . humanism is everything in Western civilization that restricts the desire for power': Foucault in Bouchard (ed.) 1971, p. 219. felt worse to many was Foucault's refusal to offer any easy rationale for political action. Unlike Marxists, he never held to an idealist vision of the future, a grand utopian (secular religious) 'alternative' to what is. 52 Although in favour of, and himself involved with, libertarian political action, his Nietzsche-indebted amoral understanding of the nature of power and the construction of social-structural thought made prescriptive action within that formulaic impossible. Because power was not simply a part of some Machiavellian plot that could be decoded through semiotic readings of signs, or readings for fixed hidden structures, and was something that might be possibilised anywhere, it could not be conceptualised from anyone's theory. 53 In retrospect, the moralistic auto-pilot of left-liberal history had consequently to be realised, and either defended or surrendered. Mostly it was defended, despite the apparent fragmentations in the contemporary world that made difficult any reference to discernable social structures-a world where there could be no new meta-narrativising Marx, or for that matter no 'Saint Foucault'. 54 'Right' and 'Left' were increasingly meaningless categories; 55 left-hugging left-overs from the 'age of structuralism'.
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Hence Foucault's non-Marxian (anti-structuralist) thought lent itself best to a generation of culturally-turned scholars, many of whom chose to be apolitical rather than share the increasing disenchantment of their social utopian elders. Others were left bewildered and vexed. Even from deep within studies of the gendered body as a cultural sitestudies much encouraged by, and politicised through, AIDS since the mid-1980s 57 -there were screams of frustration at the gap opened up between Foucault's kind of thinking and the inherited impulse to social and political action. Thinking beyond categorical constraints was itself a 'radical and necessary form of activism', but it was tempered by the depressing realisation that such activism was fast becoming 'a useless and hence expendable appendage to a culture that neither values nor understands it'. 58 To those less inclined to 'theory' it could seem that Foucault was no different than Maggie Thatcher in her inadvertently poststructuralist declaration that 'there is no such thing as society'. Yet in a context in which reactionary historians such as Gertrude Himmelfarb and Arthur Marwick were seeking blanket dismissal of associated 'Postmodernist/Marxist Junk', 59 it was not so easy for the old Left to follow suit. Raphael Samuel, the talented 52 Nor, despite resurrecting the Greek term for knowledge, 'episteme' to refer to particular 'discursive regimes', was he ever an 'epistemologue' in the derogatory French sense of one who preaches the importance of epistemology in historical thinking (of whom Foucault's teacher, Georges Canguilhem, is often regarded as the last example). I am grateful to Philippe Pignarre for this clarification. 53 Foucault in Bouchard (ed.) 1972a, p. 213; Foucault 1990, p. 94; Gutting 1994, pp. 19-20. 54 As if proof of the point, the beatification of Foucault was bestowed by one social segment, the gay community. See Halperin 1995. 55 Giddens 1994. 56 The early Foucault himself can and has been regarded as a 'structuralist'. See Kurzweil 1980 activist socialist historian, once attempted it, in a critique of the makers of postmodern thought, but the outcome was ultimately ambivalent. 60 Its title alone, 'Reading the Signs', belies its saturation in a discourse that its subject matter ill-fitted. For others like him there could only be the pious hope that the unsettling intellectual storm would pass. They did not see poststructuralism as constitutive of its AIDS-infested non-cold war times, let alone that it thereby offered 'an eminently healthy attitude [that] . . . invites us to assess the past from the standpoint of its utility for the present'. 61 At best, Foucault-type thinking was regarded as an embodied form of, if not a disguised apology for, political reactionaryism. Thus was he fitted into the very box that he served to put thought outside of. But it was hardly Foucault's fault that he made it possible to critique everything, yet provided no formulaic political solutions. He was an intellectual not a moralist, and his intellectualisations were directed to the latter's deconstruction, not to its further collapse in history-writing. Moreover, he was scarcely responsible for the times to which his work spoke. As Hayden White remarked of the postmodernist world in general that 'melts everything solid into air': 'whose fault is this? It is not the fault of postmodernism. On the contrary, postmodernism is a response to this condition, itself a product of capitalist modernity.' 62 Foucault (though eschewing the label postmodern) was merely one of its respondents, albeit an early and acute one-so much so that it is easy to regard him in relation to the now fairly spent intellectual movement of postmodernism in much the same way as we hold Manet and Seurat in relation to the aesthetic movement of modernism. But whether or not one views him in this light, or as one whose effect on historical thinking was 'revolutionary,' 63 there can be no going back on the insights he afforded for re-thinking the past from the present. Least of all does this seem possible for those who would aspire to historical relevance by way of the entanglements of medical knowledge, the body and power today. Those who would rather spend their time defending historiographical traditions (either explicitly, or through the production of more studies of what we already have) may happily do so, and need read no further. I would only say in parting, that staying still may not be so easy. For quite apart from any new understanding of medical power, the political place of doctors and their institutions now looks more alike than different from that of historians of medicine. Some 30 years after Ivan Illich penned his 'medical nemesis' and set the medical profession fashionably in the enemy camp of academics, both professions now lie equally under the blanket of managerialism with performance indicators ruling-'evidence-based medicine' for the one, 'research assessment exercises' for the other. 64 To some extent, the consequent engendered experience of 'proletarianisation' and the stackhanovite sound of the surrounding rhetoric give reason to reach back to Marxism to make sense of it all. But under the extending global blanket of 60 Samuel 1991 and . 61 White in Strath and Witoszek (eds) 1999, p. 33. 62 Ibid. 63 Veyne 1978. 64 Indeed, David Wootton (2006) , in a stunning example of 'bad history', argues for bringing historical evidence under the rule of evidence-based medicine.
commercial privatisation, with academic keyboards as much as scalpels dependent upon the flow of international capital, and under the still thicker post-utopian (and especially post-9/11/2001) faith in the power of economies to create and destroy paradise on earth, there is neither the actual nor the mental space to resurrect notions of collective consciousness. 65 Even 'de-professionalisation', as it is now revealingly referred to in the medical press, grants more semblance of coherence than seems really the case, besides signalling a fate. Hence to stay even loosely within the social history of medicine's ruling problematic of 'professionalisation' ('top down', 'bottom up' or empirically questioned as a sociological category) 66 is to bury oneself in the debris of modernity.
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In effect, the sub-discipline has been robbed of its 'medicine' by postmodernists and, simultaneously, had its political interests debased. The processes were interrelated, but present two distinct problems for the field. It is left, therefore, with no choice but to move on in order to regain either or both.
Biomedicine in 'Second Modernity'
Moving along is compelled in any event, and again for reasons emanating from the 'real world'. Not the least of these reasons is the excoriation of that which was basic to the conceptualisation of the social history of medicine: the notion of 'rights' and 'citizenship' that had been fundamental to people's sense of political belonging since the advent of state medical welfare and rationalisation in the 1940s. 68 For good or ill, we don't live there anymore. In today's world, especially in the West, it is largely through biomedical language and self-reference that people are 'made-up' and looked upon. 69 It is how authorities-political, medical, legal and penal, as well as insurance companies and potential employers-have come to classify people and, in turn, how we have come to ground our sense of expectation from these authorities. Around genetics, in particular, many people now understand and articulate aspects of themselves and, in some cases, gain their sense of social positioning and belonging. The discovery of a gene for obesity, for example, not only offers a new sense of biological destiny and a re-definition of self-responsibility, but also generates new sets of ethically approved social interactions. Commercial interests solidify and reinforce those interactions: while the social stigma of 65 On contemporary economic faith, see Schivelbusch 2004, p. 291 . 66 Pelling in Prest (ed.) 1987. 67 Among that debris may be the archive itself, which is fast disappearing in a world in which many of the functions formerly undertaken by states and deposited in official archives are now carried out by commercial firms for whom the archive is a potentially libellous paper trail. Freedom of information legislation may also be hastening its demise, along with the difficulty of actually archiving what are increasingly visual forms of information-not least in medicine. The archive as the exalted space for the recovery of empirical truth may therefore itself be turning to dust, to take Carolyn Steedman's wit a step further ( obesity becomes politically incorrect on genetic grounds, the profitable manufacture of goods for the broad-beamed gets cast in humanitarian terms. Not only does all of this reconfigure the old nature/nurture divide (which now is which?) but, more important politically, it confuses, marginalises and erodes older notions of rights and citizenship, especially those prevalent since the advent of state-funded welfare schemes. 'Rights' then come to be defined in terms of the legitimacy of a genetic group to commodity consumption, a process that blurs and (where convenient) serves further to abet the withdrawal of social rights by the state.
How this affects writing the history of medicine, I shall come to in a moment. First, though, let us note one other familiar feature of our times, the withdrawal of the state itself from health care and public health concerns. From the late nineteenth century, nation states took increasing interest in the health and welfare of their populations-populations that, in effect, defined them. Industrial production in, and for, mass society demanded it, as did industrialised warfare.
70 But in contemporary
Western liberal democracies, defined more in terms of individualised consumption than mass production, this is no longer an issue outside of elections. State priorities are no longer with the health of populations, but with 'the health' of economies through commercial investments which can only be managed by careful attention to international markets and the flow of global capital, the logic of which, as Max Weber recognised long ago, transcends the interests of politically autonomous nation states. Health and welfare follow suit, with individualised 'clients' of health care increasingly compelled to make their own privately financed arrangements, become national or international medical tourists, and/or searchers on the internet for medical advice, illness support networks, products for well-being, and on through to facilities for cosmetic and sexual surgery, the manufacture of 'techno-tots', and all manner of mind and body 'enhancement technologies'. These latter redefine 'the grounds of our sense of self and the horizons of our possible transformation'. 71 'Bio-citizenship' of a global sort thus prevails, meaning that with respect to health and identity people see themselves not primarily in a relationship to the state, with expectations as well as responsibilities as in the past, but as individual consumers within a global marketplace. Others find themselves as migrants operating between different kinds of biologically policed borders.
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Nor does the corporeal intersection of capitalism and consumerism cease at the biologised borders of the bourgeois. Some 80 per cent of drug testing conducted by pharmaceutical companies in the USA now takes place among the poor who give themselves up for income as human guinea pigs. The testing, conducted not in publicly accountable hospital settings but in motels temporarily turned into private clinics, lies wholly outside the legal and intellectual domain of academic bioethics whose practitioners argue against raising the remuneration for these experimental subjects on, bizarrely, conventional medical ethical grounds. 73 Or, to take a very different example, that of health 70 Cooter and Sturdy in Cooter et al. (eds) 
Toward a New Construction Site
More details and more examples of how the world of 'medicine' and 'public health' are being reconstituted can readily be supplied. But that is not to the point here, which is that the re-configurations of medicine and the body through the entanglements of biomedicine in 'second modernity' achieve no conceptual purchase in the social (-cum-'cultural') history of medicine. What's more, by not engaging with them, the sub-discipline merely reproduces familiar memories and moralisations of health-and-welfare practices at the same time as it protects anachronistic conceptual tools for their analysis. That is, it sustains the invariants that make up its problematic, including, above all, the invariant of a 'history of medicine' discipline itself. But the reconfiguration of rights and citizenship, the withdrawal of the state from health and welfare, the creation of commercial spaces beyond academic bioethics, and the roles of philanthropy and the media in contemporary health and health education, demand not just new ways of thinking about the present and the future, but also, how the practice of historicising might be re-thought. In order to do so, it is necessary to be clear about how medical history has been politically and morally entrenched in 'the past'. One thing that stands out clearly is how almost all our historical narratives have been written within, and reinforce, a discourse that celebrates medical humanitarianism and then separates this from the world of commerce-a technique that, within medicine, stems more or less directly from John Gregory and the Scottish Enlightenment of the eighteenth century. 77 The history of 'public health', for instance, is freighted with an idealisation of state medicine as the bearer of this medical humanism, and simply assumes the 'moral impropriety' of the 'commercial'. Ideologically loaded in its moral premise, it implicitly serves a political end, the further idealisation of anti-capitalist medicine, or the reproduction of the socialist ideals articulated by T. H. Marshall and other 'fathers' of the welfare state. My point is not the obvious one that has been made by others, that, in the face of the demise of the welfare state, radical revision is required to previous histories that assumed its triumph. Conceptually, it is not the demise of welfare medicine and its history that matters, so much as the erosion evident through contemporary medical projects of the separation between 'the humanitarian' and 'the commercial'. For it is the visibility of this erosion that brings to the surface the underlying moral loading of the social history of medicine and throws into question what its practitioners have always taken for granted. It opens the way to investigating the separation itself as a construct that came to be embedded in and reproduced through history of medicine narratives as much as through medical rhetoric. At the same time, along the way, it encourages us to estrange and historicise the construction of the modernist concept of 'the public' and 'health', along with 'welfare', 'medicine' and 'history' itself.
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Social-cum-cultural historians of medicine should rejoice at this. It liberates them from the moral-political strangulations of the sort that often make them feel compelled to seek relevance in, for example, jumping on the 'disability' bandwagon, when, arguably, relevance lies more in comprehending the somatic culture that permits the valorisation of 'disability studies' in the first place. The only caveat that needs lodging here is that the somatic present is not the only present-it is not the only show in town 79 -and it is not everywhere entirely different from its recent past. Hence old concepts and concerns need not necessarily be discarded in the name of some postmodern new-or not entirely so. 'Medicalisation', for example, although it may be a sterile analytical concept, 80 is hardly a moribund phenomenon in a world in which experts on eating and on children's play cause every parent to wonder if their offspring are getting too much of the one and not enough of the other, or vice versa. The historian of medicine, Robert Nye, in a valuable recent essay on the history of the concept of medicalisation makes this historiographical point all the sharper by reminding us how powerfully contemporary medicalisations such as this continue to compromise a political discourse on 'rights'. (eds) 1993. For a social historian's view of medicine as a moral enterprise, see Rosenberg 1999. 78 An (albeit peculiar) exception to the absence of deconstructivist studies of 'public' and 'health' in 'public health' is Figlio in Richards (ed.) 1989. 79 Although other pressing matters such as 'carbon footprints', 'terrorism', and 'globalisation' may not be quite so far removed from the projects of biopower as we sometimes superficially suppose. 80 Rose 2007a. 81 Nye 2003. thoughtful summary of the social renderings of new genetic technologies. 'Older forms of cultural classification of bio-identity such as race, gender, and age', he writes, 'have no more disappeared than medicalization or normalization have-although the meanings and the practices that constitute them certainly are changing' (italics mine).
82 Which is to say somewhat more than that well-entrenched social processes and biomedical practices simply carry on, as if we inhabited an ancient city where parts of older civilizations still function. 83 To highlight (as Rabinow does) that many contemporary technologies 'simultaneously re-constitute and entrench [human] knowledge of "life itself" is to acknowledge historical continuities from a vantage that simultaneously reconstitutes the platform from which we view the "ancient city"'. We cannot simply stalk it as we might have done a decade or so ago. Hence, perhaps a better metaphor for where we have arrived is 'construction site'-a place where (with cranes moving horizontally and vertically) not just 'the past' and 'the future' are to be understood as constructs constantly under construction, but 'the present' too, and 'the past' as a construct sustained by the present.
There is no particular advantage therefore in running to a 'cultural' recasting of the social history of medicine as if to find there a more meaningful 'past tense'. Although implicit to this registering of new historiographical imperatives is a recognition of the problem of 'the social', the exercise tends to fudge, rather than face, the embedded epistemological issues-the 'what we are not knowing'-that I have tried to raise here. 84 The culturalist revision enterprise merely sustains the sub-discipline and defends disciplinarity itself, as if there was something intrinsically virtuous in either act (as opposed, perhaps, to defending the utility of academic worksites). Does this mean that historians of medicine should give up any claim to identity? I think not, though I don't much care. It is more a matter 'merely' of throwing off the constraints of another Enlightenment project, disciplinarity-of treating that, too, as a relic of the past, along with the inflated notion of 'inter-disciplinarity' that reinforces it. If at the same time we acknowledge that medical knowledge, the body, and power, have always been entangled constructs, and that historical writing on them has been equally so, then there is no reason to share the depression of other historians over the 'future of the past', for its conception wholly ceases to be antiquarian. 85 Instead, it becomes a considered historical engagement with the present, revising and deepening the now dominant scripts of sociologists, epistemologists of scientific knowledge, anthropologists, gender theorists, spatial geographers, and philosophers. In new and more positive ways historians might even deepen their engagement with practitioners of contemporary medicine, appreciating (while savouring the irony) that, like historians, they too have been destabilised and now search for new ways to intellectualise. Unlike the plummeting share price of social history, the exchange value of intellectual engagement with biopower, biopolitics and 'posthuman medicine' 86 is steeply risingand deservedly so. Crucially, these projects matter as never before in human history, and those with training in the history of medicine have the expertise to help make sense of them. Who else, after all, is so experienced at teasing out the contingencies around the material and intellectual making of the body? Who knows better the multiplicity of agents involved in the construction of the institutions around that object/ subject? And who, given their detailed knowledge of medicine as an 'art' as much as a science-an art indivisible from philosophy-can be more sensitive to the perception of history itself as an art, similarly indivisible and 'made-up', its narrative closures always being provisional? Social historians of medicine have only to leave behind their old regimes of truth, and fear not the devaluation of some of their most treasured concepts and intuitions.
And?
It has not been the purpose of this paper to resolve the overwhelming question that it begs-less that of where we go from here, than how we go. Where we go will remain in part a matter of future circumstances, and collective and individual choices. 87 But how we engage must be something for rigorous open debate and discussion. 88 That, above all, is the imperative to which this paper leads. And from that vantage, 'moving along' also necessitates 'going back'-going back to the job for which we are paid: hard reflection on how the conceptual and material edifices build around the human body serve critical understanding of the human condition. If we truly value the culture of intellectual work, it is time to re-radicalise in its defence: to engage seriously not just with what it is to be human in a world in which the corporeal is prioritised and in which power in and around the body seems more dispersed than ever before, but also with the question of how we as historians within the somatic postmodern world can further the critique of it. On what methodological grounds can it be conducted 86 The term is now widely deployed; see, for example, Waldby 2000. 87 Given the predominance of the visual in modern medicine, one of my own choices is with exploring the history of visualisation strategies around the body in different biopolitical contexts from the late nineteenth century. Many other scholars have begun to explore the nature of historical exchange in medicine from a global perspective, a project that also involves rethinking the old moral narratives of modernity, as well as, specifically, the limitations of cold-war composed 'international history' and 'world history'. See, for example, Cook 2007. 88 To judge from much recent work, the methodological tendency is towards multi-layered ethnography focused on the emergence or ontology of things perceived as 'epistemic', rather than aiming to fit things to fixed structures or contain them in absolutist boxes of knowledge through pre-given morally ascribed and privileged language and categories. Central to much of this work, and further reflecting its debts to Foucaultian thinking, is the problem of constituting the objects of evidence at the same time as constituting the criteria for objective knowledge. See, for example, Keating and Cambrosio 2003; Rheinberger 1997; Thompson 2005; Mol 2002; Kirby 1997 . Important, too, is rethinking how 'evidence' and 'knowledge' are to be understood. See Pickering 1995; Zammito 2004 . I am tempted to advance what might be called 'capitalist history'-not a defence of capitalism, but a methodology that parallels its successful possibilising of money-making anywhere and everywhere in an unfixed world, a methodology that could also heed, and make a historical virtue of, what Giddens (1990) 
